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NOTES
THE STANDARD OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY
FOR CONDUCT OF SUPERVISORY
PERSONNEL UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
I. Introduction
In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(the Act) to address the epidemic problem of injuries in the Ameri-
can workplace.' The Act was not intended to provide compensation
for the injured employee nor to affect existing compensation stat-
utes.2 Rather, the congressional purpose was prophylaxis: "through
the exercise of its powers to regulate commerce . . . , to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources. . ."3
The Act imposes a general duty on employers to provide a work
environment "free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm.' In addition, the Act
creates a special duty to follow standards created by the Secretary
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
The report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee states: "The purpose of of
[the Act] is to reduce the number and severity of work-related injuries and illnesses which,
despite current efforts of employers and government, are resulting in ever increasing human
misery and economic loss." S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
The Senate committee report states further:
14,500 persons are killed annually as a result of industrial accidents; accordingly,
during the past four years more Americans have been killed where they work than in
the Vietnam war. By the lowest count, 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each
year, resulting in the loss of 250 million man days of work - many times more than
are lost through strikes.
In addition to the individual human tragedies involved, the economic impact of
industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost wages,
and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is estimated to be over $8 billion.
Vast resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay
workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses.
Id. at 2.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1970).
3. Id. § 651.
4. Id. § 654.
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of Labor in recognition of certain dangerous circumstances.5 The
Act also establishes an employee duty to comply with these stan-
dards. Ultimate responsibility for compliance, however, lies with
the employer.7
A recent decision8 has highlighted a difference of opinion arising
among the United States courts of appeals regarding the parameters
of employer responsibility under the Act for the conduct of employ-
ees. Prior to this decision the courts had been in apparent agreement
that Congress intended a limited standard of reasonable diligence.9
The Fourth Circuit, however, in Ocean Electric Corp. v. OSHRC,10
indicated that a more stringent standard of liability should apply
when the negligent actions of foremen, acting in their supervisory
capacity, result in the injury or death of rank-and-file personnel."
In essence, the court distinguishes between employer liability for
supervisors and for employees. 2 The greater number of circuits have
not been confronted with the factual situation presented in Ocean. 13
Those that were, tended to equate supervisory personnel with
employees and applied an equivalent standard of responsibility."
This Note will examine the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ocean, and
will attempt to analyze it in light of the rationale applied by the
other circuits in similar circumstances.
5. Id. § 654(c)(2).
An employer acting in compliance with a promulgated standard is deemed to be in compli-
ance with his general duty to the extent of that standard. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5 (f) (1977).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1970).
7. Id. § 666.
8. Ocean Electric Corp. v. OSHRC, No. 76-1060 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as Ocean].
9. Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 530 F.2d 1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976); Home Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Butler Lime and
Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975); Cape and Vineyard Div. of the New Bedford
Gas and Edison Co. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1155 (lst Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC
(Hanovia), 502 F.2d 946, 947 (3d Cir. 1974); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825-
26 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); See also Case Comment, Employee Noncompliance with OSHA Safety Standards,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 1041 (1976).
10. No. 76-1060 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1977).
11. Ocean, slip op. at 10.
12. Id. at 10-11.
13. Id. at 10.
14. See cases cited in Ocean, slip op. at 10 n.6.
The courts dealing with factual situations similar to Ocean have not made any explicit
distinction between supervisory and rank and file employees. See Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC,
530 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1976); Cape and Vineyard Div. of the New Bedford Gas and Edison
Co. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1975); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1974).
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The Act is administered by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), through the imposition of fines, and in
some instances, upon conviction, criminal penalties on employers
who maintain hazardous working conditions in violation of their
congressionally imposed duties.'5 After determination by an admin-
istrative law judge, contested citations and penalties are reviewed
by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the
Commission).' 6 Judicial review of the Commission's decisions is
available in the United States courts of appeals to any aggrieved
person and to the Secretary of Labor.17 The Commission's findings
of fact, if not supported by substantial evidence on the record con-
sidered as a whole, are within the scope of judicial review.'8 One
court has held that apart from questions of fact, the Commission's
adjudications can be set aside when they are "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law." 9
Actual injury or death is not required for finding a violation of
either general or specific employer duties." Violations under the Act
are divided into three categories: willful, serious, and simple viola-
tions.' A finding of a willful violation does not require moral turpi-
tude. It does, obviously, require a showing of willfulness or con-
structive willfulness as evidenced by repetitive violations.23 A seri-
ous violation exists when dangerous conditions or practices in the
workplace create a substantial probability that death or serious
15. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
16. Id. § 659(c).
17. Id. § 660. Aggrieved persons may obtain review in any of the following United States
courts of appeals: (a) the circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, (b) the
circuit in which the employer has its principal office, or (c) the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Secretary is limited to review in either the circuit in which the violation is alleged to
have occurred, or the circuit in which the employer has its principal office. Id.
18. Id. § 660(a).
19. Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia), 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing 5 U.S.C. §
706 (2)(A)(1970)).
20. The employer's duty is to provide a workplace free of recognized hazards and to
comply with promulgated standards. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1970). There are, however, provisions
for more serious penalties when death results from a violation. Id. § 666(e).
21. Id. §§ 666(a)-666(c).
22. United States v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975); F.X. Messina
Construction Corp., 505 F.2d 701, 702 (1st Cir. 1974).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970). The provisions of the Act concerning willful violations are
not limited to grieviously dangerous situations, but include circumstances that would consti-
tute a simple violation if the requisite willfullness were not present. Id.
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physical harm could result." For a serious violation to be estab-
lished, however, an employer must have knowledge, actual or im-
plied, of the existence of the violation. 5 The burden of proving
employer knowledge is upon the Secretary of Labor."
II. Ocean Electric Corp. v. OSHRC
Petitioner corporation in Ocean Electric Corp. v. OSHRC27 had a
contract to install equipment in an electrical power substation.
Ocean's foreman, put in charge of the work by the job superinten-
dant, negligently left open a box containing energized bus bars.3
The foreman then gave orders to an employee causing him to come
in contact with the open area of the box. The employee was electro-
cuted.3
Ocean was cited for a serious violation of a promulgated safety
standard'O and assessed a fine of $700.31 The corporation contested
the citation which was affirmed by an administrative law judge. 2
In turn, the judge's order was affirmed by the Commission.3 The
Commission reasoned that an employer is not liable for the negli-
gent actions of supervisory personnel if the employer had exercised
all reasonably possible avenues of prevention.34 It found, however,
that Ocean did not show the accident to be unpreventable, because
it failed to show the extent of its safety training program.3 5
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Commission's order,3 but re-
jected its conclusion that an employer is not liable for the unprev-
entable actions of its foremen.37 The majority distinguished the situ-
ation in which an employee is injured or killed due to his own sui-
cidal or willfully reckless behavior, from injuries or death resulting
24. Id. § 666(j).
25. Id.
26. Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1975).
27. No. 76-1060 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1977).
28. Ocean, slip op. at 4.
29. Id.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.957(a)(3) (1977). This regulation provides that extraordinary caution
be exercised in the conduct of work in energized substations.
31. Ocean, slip op. at 2.
32. 3 0cc. S". & HEmLTH DEC. (CCH) 18,422 (1975).
33. 3 EMPL. SA'. & HEALTH GUIDE 20,167.
34. Id. at 23,994.
35. Id.
36. Ocean, slip op. at 12.
37. Id. at 5.
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from unsafe conditions and negligently inadequate instructions
given by a supervisor." Although the employer argued that it should
not be be held liable for its foreman's mere human errors, the court
concluded that a corporation cannot be separated from its supervi-
sory personnel." The late Judge J. Braxton Craven, writing for the
majority, emphasized, "a corporation can furnish its employees
with safe working conditions only by acting through its managerial
and supervisory personnel."10 Thus, the prevailing opinion in Ocean
embraced a standard of respondeat superior for applying the sanc-
tions of the Act in situations of serious violations caused by supervi-
sory personnel."
The other opinions questioned whether the standard of respon-
"deat superior was proper in light of the congressional intent. Chief
Judge Clement F. Haynesworth, Jr., in a concurring opinion, indi-
cated his belief that the majority's imputation of the foreman's
acts created a standard of strict liability and that this standard was
not intended by Congress." The company, according to the concur-
ring opinion, "is responsible for its foreman's conduct unless it does
everything reasonably possible to assure compliance with the Act. '4 3
The effect of this standard is to focus analysis upon the employer's
safety training program in order to determine whether it has ex-
38. Id. at 5, 6.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 11. The court states, "We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that 'fain
employer is responsible for the acts of a foreman performed in the course of his employ-
ment.' "Id. (emphasis added).
In addition to its imputation analysis, the majority indicated that the foreman's instruc-
tions to the employee, in violation of the safety regulation constituted evidence of Ocean's
failure to maintain an adequate safety-training program, and to exercise reasonable precau-
tion for prevention of the accident. Id. at 12. The court said, in dictum, that the doubt raised
by the foreman's order rendered insufficient a stipulation that Ocean engaged a private
contractor for the purpose of instructing its employees in safety techniques. Id.
42. Id. at 13-14 (Haynesworth, C.J., concurring).
The House Education and Labor Committee report stated:
An employer's duty under [section 651] is not an absolute one. It is the Committee's
intent that an employer exercise care to furnish a safe and healthful place to work and
to provide safe tolls and equipment. This is not a vague duty, but is the protection of
the worker from preventable dangers.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970).
Chief Judge Haynesworth, however, would apply a stricter standard in the case of a viola-
tion caused by a company president not subject to internal discipline for his acts. Ocean, slip
op. at 14 n.1 (Haynesworth, C.J., concurring).
43. Id. at 14.
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hausted all reasonably possible means of compliance." The concurr-
ence agreed with the Commission's determination that Ocean failed
to show the adequacy of its training program.45
Judge John A. Field, Jr. disapproved the affirmance of the
citation." His dissent defined the majority's approach as based
in tort concepts, and indicated his belief that Congress intended a
different standard." "The Act," stated the dissenting opinion, "is
addressed to conditions, not isolated episodes of negligence.""
Citing a Fifth Circuit decision,49 the dissent asserted that it is im-
proper to find an enployer liable -through an imputation theory for
the "unpreventable acts" of its foremen. 0 The dissenting opinion,
however, stated that a proper item for imputation might be a fore-
man's knowledge of a static condition.'
The dissent averred that the result of the rationale of the commis-
sion and the concurring opinion would require parties seeking to
protest a citation under the Act to introduce evidence of their safety
training programs.2 "[T]his," said the dissenting opinion, "places
an intolerable burden upon the employer which is utterly at vari-
ance with the plain language and objectives of the Act."53
III. The Earlier Decisions
A. The Standard of Liability in Serious Violation Cases
A foreman for the petitioner corporation in National Realty and
Construction Co. v. OSHRC I was killed while riding on the running
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. Id. Ocean claimed inadequate notice that its safety training program would be in
issue. To this, the concurring opinion asserted Ocean's own answer to the Commission's
complaint as showing notice to the company. Id. Ocean's answer asserted that it "had taken
all reasonable precautions . . . in planning the work, . . . in training its employees to avoid
unsafe practices, and in taking all practical steps to insure the safety of its employees." Id.
The dissenting opinion, however, concluded that by basing its decision on Ocean's safety
program, the Commission violated its own rules of procedure and the corporation's due
process rights. Id. at 25-26 (Field, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 19-20.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976).
50. Ocean, slip op. at 21 (Field, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 25-26.
53. Id. at 26.
54. 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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board of a front end loader in contravention of company policy."
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the Commis-
sion's affirmance of a finding of a serious violation of the employer's
general duty under the Act.5" The court indicated that an employer
might have a greater duty to ensure the proper conduct of supervi-
sors than rank and file employees.57 But National Realty concluded
that an employer's duty to maintain a workplace free of recognized
dangerous conditions does not include the eradication of unprevent-
able hazardous conduct." The court defined unpreventable hazard-
ous conduct as:
[conduct] so idiosyncratic and implausible in motive or means that consci-
entious experts, familiar with the industry, would not take it into account in
prescribing a safety program. Nor is misconduct preventable if its elimina-
tion would require methods of hiring, training, monitoring, or sanctioning
workers which are either so untested or so expensive that safety experts would
substantially concur in thinking the methods infeasible."
National Realty, however, indicated that equipment riding
should not be included within the class of instances of unpreventa-
ble hazardous conduct. 0 Rather, the decision turned on the Secre-
tary's failure to carry his burden of proof by not showing with partic-
ularity the feasibility of preventing this type of conduct.6'
Ocean's majority correctly distinguished National Realty by stat-
ing that it involved a foreman acting in a nonsupervisory capacity.62
The dissent in Ocean read National Realty as standing for the prop-
osition that the Act applies only to hazardous conditions as opposed
to isolated instances of negligence. 3
55. Id. at 1262.
56. Id. at 1268. The majority of the Commission found the implementation of the com-
pany policy against equipment riding inadequate and that more positive steps Were required
to be considered in compliance under the Act. Id.
57. Id. at 1267 n.38.
58. Id. at 1266.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1267.
61. Id.
62. Ocean, slip op. at 10.
63. Id. at 20 (Field, J., dissenting). Ocean's dissent further relied on the language in
National Realty to support its contention that the employer's due process rights were violated
by the Commission:
An employer is unfairly deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine or to present
rebuttal evidence and testimony when it learns the exact nature of its alleged violation
only after the hearing. As noted above, the Secretary has considerable scope before and
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A fatal accident occurred in REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan64 when
a corporation's supervisors permitted untrained personnel to work
on high voltage electrical equipment under dangerous conditions. 5
Without discussing the question of imputation, the Second Circuit
upheld the Commission's order finding the employer liable for a
serious violation of his general duty under the Act."6 In so finding,
the court emphasized the employer's duty to furnish a safe work-
place." If this implies an imputation of the employer's responsibil-
ity from the actions of its supervisory personnel, the implication is
not without its boundaries. Indeed, the court noted that the Act
does not impose a standard of absolute liability on the employer.68
The court indicated that the employer's duty under the Act is not
the same as at common law." Whether this difference in duties
excludes the doctrine of respondeat superior from being applied
when supervisors create conditions dangerous to other employees is
during a hearing to alter his pleadings and legal theories. But the Commission cannot
make these alterations itself in the face of an empty record. To merit judicial defer-
ence, the Commission's expertise must operate upon, not seek to replace, record evi-
dence.
489 F.2d at 1287 (footnote omitted).
64. 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974).
65. Id. at 824. The dangerous conditions consisted of water on a concrete floor near the
high voltage area, and "a lack of insulated equipment." Id.
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id. at 825-26.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 825. The court refused to accept the corporation's contention that the common
law defenses of contributory negligence and assuption of the risk should apply. Nor would
the court accept the employer's claim of exculpation by way of an independent contractor.
Id. at 825-26.
The court specifically eschewed congressional language to the effect that the general duty
clause restates the employer's common law duty. Id. at 825 (citing Morey, The General Duty
Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 1003 n.66
(1973)).
The Senate Committee Report states:
Under principles of common law, individuals are obliged to refrain from actions which
cause harm to others. . . . Statutes usually increase but sometimes modify this duty.
The Committee believes that employers are equally bound by this general and common
duty to bring no adverse effects to the life and health of their employees throughout
the course of their employment. [The general duty clause], in providing that employ-
ers must furnish employment "which is free from recognized hazards so as to provide
safe and healthful working conditions," merely restates that each employer shall fur-
nish this degree of care.
S. RFP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970). See H.R. RP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1970).
not clear from the opinion. Ocean read REA Express as affirming
the finding of a violation because the corporation's supervisory per-
sonnel were aware of the dangerous condition. 0
In Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC,1' an employee was instructed by the
corporation's area engineer to have a pressure vessel constructed
and tested for use on an oil rig. Although the engineer emphasized
the necessity of pressure testing, the employee installed the vessel
untested. An explosion occurred resulting in the death of that em-
ployee. Prior to the installation of the vessel the area engineer and
two other supervisors had opportunities to inquire whether it had
been tested.72 Based on their failure to inquire, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the Commission's determination that Getty failed to exer-
cise reasonable diligence to discover the hazard and thus had com-
mitted a serious violation of its general duty under the Act.73 In so
finding, the court stated that "[tihe section is intended neither to
impose liability on the employer for an employee's negligence on a
respondeat superior basis, nor to create a standard of absolute lia-
bility. ' 7 Despite this language, in imputing the supervisor's failure
to inquire to the employer, the court appears to distinguish employ-
ees from supervisory personnel."
Two months before its decision in Getty, the Fifth Circuit dis-
cussed the imputation problem in Home Plumbing & Heating Co.
v. OSHRC.71 In Horne, two foremen were killed in a collapse of an
unshored portion of a work trench. The foremen were working in this
unprotected area in contravention of their employer's express in-
structions and past safety policy." The administrative law judge
70. Ocean, slip op. at 10. The court, however, indicated that REA Express was cited by
petitioner as support for its argument that the scope of the Act does not include unprevent-
able and unforeseeable employee acts. Id.
71. 530 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Id. at 1144.
73. Id. at 1146.
74. Id. at 1145 (emphasis in original).
75. The court does not find the requisite employer knowledge of the dangerous condition
from the deceased employee's knowledge of the fact that the vessel was untested, but finds
it constructively from the area engineer's recognition of the danger. The court stated,
"[Thus it is clear that the hazard at issue here was both 'recognized' and likely to cause
serious harm, as well as preventable by the simple expedient of pressure testing. Getty's
recognition of this fact was thoroughly established by the fact that King [the area engineer]
had emphasized the need for testing." Id. at 1145 (emphasis added).
76. 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976).
77. The court in Horne emphasized the employer's past safety record and procedures. Id.
at 566-67.
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concluded that the employer's instructions did not bar a finding of
a serious violation of the Act, holding that under the principles of
agency law, the knowledge of the foreman was that of the em-
ployer.7" The court of appeals emphasized that in order to prove a
serious violation the Secretary had the burden of showing employer
knowledge under section 666(j) of the Act.79 In reversing the Com-
mission's affirmance of the citation, 0 the court refused to impute
the knowledge of the deceased foreman to the employer, stating:
It was error to find Home [the employer] liable on an imputation theory for
the unforeseeable, implausible, and therefore unpreventable acts of his em-
ployees. A contrary holding would not further the policies of the Act, and it
would result in the imposition of a standard virtually indistinguishable from
one of strict or absolute liability, which Congress through section [6666)]
specifically eschewed."'
Although the findings of the Fifth Circuit in Getty and in Horne
differ in result, the cases are reconcilable. The courts in both cases
focused on the statutory requirement of showing employer knowl-
edge of the dangerous circumstances." Getty upheld the Commis-
sion's determination that the employer failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in obtaining knowledge of the dangerous condition. s3
Horne found that the employer had exercised reasonable diligence,84
and then refused to impute to him the knowledge of the foremen.85
In Getty, however, there is an implicit imputation of the negligence
of the supervisory personnel to the employer. The court found that
the supervisors could have ascertained the dangerous condition with
reasonable diligence. 8 Their failure to inquire became the corpora-
tion's failure. This seeming conflict between the cases is attributa-
ble to two factual differences. First, Horne was a solely owned pro-
prietorship. The employer-proprietor had left the worksite just prior
78. Id. at 567.
79. Id. at 568.
80. Id. at 571.
81. Id.
82. 530 F.2d at 1145; 528 F.2d at 568.
83. 530 F.2d at 1146.
84. 528 F.2d at 469. "On the facts of this case it is readily apparent that Mr. Home [the
employer] did everything within his power to ensure compliance with the law .... Id.
85. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
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to the accident after finding adherence to all safety measures. 7 On
the other hand, Getty was a corporation. The policies of a corpora-
tion as large as Getty can only be implemented through its supervi-
sory personnel. Taken one step further, a corporation such as Getty
can only have knowledge of the existence of a violation through its
supervisors. As a second basis for distinction, Horne concerned fore-
men engaging in conduct hazardous to their own health and safety.
Getty, however, involved designated personnel acting in a supervi-
sory capacity. Their failure to inquire represented a danger to rank
and file employees. Therefore, if in Horne two workmen were killed
and a foreman was supervising, then it is possible the employer
would have been found liable despite his diligence in issuing safety
instructions. This possibility is severely, and correctly limited by
the Fifth Circuit's indication that the employer's duty is not an
absolute one.8 The Fifth Circuit, however, has not stated a clear
test to be applied in situations where violations of the Act occur due
to supervisory failure.
Cape and Vineyard Division of the New Bedford Gas and Edison
Co. v. OSHRC9 concerned the electrocution of a lineman employed
by a utility company. The company was found in violation of a
promulgated safety standard requiring the wearing of protective
clothing "whenever it is necessary."90 The administrative law judge
and the Commission found that employer violated the Act when its
foreman, in the light of substantial probability of death or serious
physical injury, allowed the lineman to determine for himself the
necessity of safety equipment." The First Circuit reversed, holding
that the regulation was insufficient by itself to give the company
notice that additional protective equipment was needed under the
circumstances." The court, however, noted that actual knowledge
of a hazardous practice would satisfy the requirement of fair no-
tice,9" and indicated that a company's own safety rules could pro-
87. Id. Ironically, Mr. Home left the worksite to attend a safety seminar. 528 F.2d at 569.
88. 530 F.2d at 1143; 528 F.2d at 571.
89. 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1975).
90. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1977).
91. 512 F.2d at 1151-52. The accident occurred directly after the lineman told another
employee, working with him on the buddy system, that he did not need additional safety
equipment. Id. at 1151.
92. Id. at 1152.
93. Id. Absent a showing of actual knowledge, the court would ask "whether a reasonably
1978]
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perly be considered as evidence of that knowledge."
New Bedford Gas also agreed with the administrative law judge
that the implementation of the safety rules was the function of the
foreman." The First Circuit refused to require continuous super-
vision as a method of implementation." The case, however, turns
on the failure of the regulation to give adequate notice. 7 The court
stated: "the company was not charged with negligent lack of super-
vision or of any other violation of the general duty clause, but
rather with failure to comply with the protective equipment stan-
dard." 8 Although the decision is limited to the inadequacy of the
regulation under the circumstances, the court thus indicates that it
would accept negligent supervision as a basis of finding an employer
liable for the actions of its foremen. The degree to which the First
Circuit would hold an employer liable for lack of supervision is not
apparent from New Bedford Gas.
The Seventh Circuit, in Brennan v. Butler Liihe and Cement Co.99
was confronted with the actions of a rank and file employee result-
ing in his own death. In deciding the issue of the employer's liability
for these acts, the court states, "that if an employee is negligent or
creates a violation of a safety standard, that does not necessarily
prevent the employer from being held responsible for the viola-
tion."100
In Butler Lime and Cement, an employee delivering cement to a
construction site was electrocuted when he brought the boom of his
employer's crane too close to an overhead power line. The employee
acted in violation of a promulgated safety standard that provides
that crane boom should not be brought within ten feet of a certain
class of energized lines.'"' The Commission affirmed the finding of
the administrative law judge that the employer should not be held
liable in light of its past safety record and the circumstances of the
prudent man familiar with the circumstances of the industry would have protected against
the hazard." Id.
94. Id. at 1154.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1155.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975).
100. Id. at 1017.
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1S0(j)(i)(1977).
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accident tending to show it was unforeseeable. '"' The Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected this analysis, and agreed with dissenting Commis-
sioner Cleary, "'that the administrative law judge erroneously
shifted responsibility for compliance from [the employer] to the
electrocuted employee. . . .' " The court, implying an imputa-
tion theory, asserted that the employer's violation of its specific
duty under the Act occurred at the moment its employee brought
the boom within ten feet of the power lines in noncompliance with
the standard.' °4 The court, however, would limit the employer's lia-
bility by requiring reasonable diligence in discovering employee vio-
lations of safety regulations.0 5 Applying this standard, Butler Lime
and Cement found that the employer failed to act with reasonable
diligence because of the inadequacy of its safety-training program.06
Since Butler Lime and Cement did not concern actions of supervi-
sory personnel resulting in employee injury, the question arises as
to how the Seventh Circuit would handle that situation. Given the
court's willingness to find an employer liable for the negligent con-
duct of employees,' 7 it is likely that the court would afford the same
treatment to the acts of foremen. It is unclear, however, whether the
circuit would equate foremen with employees or consider them an
extension of management. If the circuit considers foremen equiva-
lent to employees under the Act, then it is likely the reasonable
diligence test stated in Butler Lime and Cement would apply to
limit employer liability for the conduct of foremen as well.
Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia),"' concerned employer responsi-
bility for the actions of an employee resulting in his own death. In
that case a technician for a lamp manufacturer was electrocuted
while conducting an experiment for his employer. The evidence es-
tablished that the technician was acting in violation of "universally
102. 520 F.2d at 1016.
103. Id. at 1017.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1016-17 "[T]he evidence as to the adequacy of Butler's safety program was
sharply split. Yet the administrative law judge failed to make a clear finding on this impor-
tant issue." Id. at 1016. The court stated further that "[o]nly the dissenting Commissioner
spoke to the point." Id. at 1017. Thus, the court felt competent to rule on the issue of the
adequacy of the company's safety program in light of the standard of review with respect to
questions of fact of substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. Id.
107. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
108. 502 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1974).
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recognized safety standards."'' 9 The Third Circuit found that the
Act did not impose strict liability "for the results of idiosyncratic,
demented, or perhaps suicidal self-exposure of employees to recog-
nized hazards.""0 The court did find that the general duty clause
requires employers to prevent hazardous conduct by employees."
The court remanded the Commission's no violation order because
it failed to deal with the issue of adequate supervision under the
circumstances. 1 2
The Hanovia court was not asked to decide an employer's liability
for injuries resulting from the acts of supervisory personnel. Its re-
fusal to apply a standard of strict liability indicates that it would
endeavor to limit liability in those circumstances. The court's hold-
ing, however, concerning the employer's duty to provide adequate
supervision suggests that the circuit might hold an employer to a
greater degree of responsibility for the conduct of employees acting
in a supervisory capacity.
B. Willful Violation Cases
Ocean involved a serious but not willful violation of the Act."' In
its imputation analysis, however, the court adopted the rationale
applied in two willful violation cases."
In United States v. Dye Construction Co.,"' the Tenth Circuit
upheld a trial court conviction of a corporation, under the criminal
penalties provisions of the Act,"' for willful failure to shore or slope
a trench, resulting in the death of a workman." 7 In so finding, the
court clearly applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to find
willfulness under the Act. It stated:
109. Id. at 950.
110. Id. at 951. Another issue within the case was the proper scope of judicial review of
the adjudicatory conclusions of the Commission.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 953.
113. See notes 28-42 and accompanying text supra.
114. Ocean, slip op. at 8-9. The court stated:
We do not have before us a charge of willful violation of the Act, and therefore do not
have to decide whether we would follow the First and Tenth Circuits in imputing
employer's knowledge to a corporation in such circumstances. We do, however, think
the logic of their approach is applicable in the instant case.
Id. at 9.
115. 510 F.2d 78.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1970).
117. 510 F.2d at 84.
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We find no merit in the further contention that the corporation cannot be
guilty of willfulness based on the acts, conduct and inferentially the states
of mind of the employees. . . . [Tihe president is not the only individual
whose state of mind would be relevant. The cases recognize that corporations
are responsible for the acts and omissions of their authorized agents acting
in the scope of their employment."8
Interestingly, in Dye, only two of the three persons present at the
time of the accident were foremen. The court never distinguished
between the functions of the foremen and the other employee.
Rather, in upholding the conviction, Dye stated that it was within
the province of the jury to find willfulness from any one of these
persons."'
The First Circuit, in F.X. Messina Construction Corp. v.
OSHRC,' 0 upheld the Commission's order affirming a finding of a
willful violation. 2' The court imputed the willful actions of a fore-
man to his employer.' 22 Unlike Dye, F. X. Messina clearly holds that
the operative state of mind was that of the foreman.123 The court
states: "Petitioner, through its foreman, made its choice, a con-
scious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary decision. . . ,,.2,
Ocean'25 also cited another willful violation case, Intercounty
Construction Co. v. OSHRC,'2 6 as lending analogous support to its
decision. In Intercounty, the Fourth Circuit upheld a commission
order finding that an employer had committed a willful violation
when its job foreman failed to heed safety instructions given by
OSHA to the company.' 27 The court refused to accept the employer's
argument that the violation was not willful due to the foreman's
good faith belief that the area was safe.' 21
C. Floyd S. Pike Electrical Contractor Inc. v. OSHRC
One month before Ocean was decided, the Fourth Circuit dealt
with similar issues in Floyd S. Pike Electrical Contractor Inc. v.
118. Id. at 82.
119. Id.
120. 505.F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1974).
121. Id. at 702.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ocean, slip op. at 9.
125. 522 F.2d 777 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1072 (1976).
126. Id. at 781.
127. The opinion of the court was joined by Judge Field who dissented in Ocean.
128. 522 F.2d at 779.
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OSHRC. ," In Pike, the court vacated and remanded an order of the
Commission imputing a foreman's knowledge of hazardous condi-
tions to his employer.' 3 The conditions, which were in violation of
a safety standard,'3 ' resulted in the foreman's death. The case was
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Commission's later de-
cision in Secretary v. Engineers Construction Inc. 3 In that case, an
employer was cited for a violation of a safety standard requiring the
shoring of trenches'33 when its foreman was discovered working in
an unsafe trench.' 4 The administrative law judge held the company
liable for the actions of the foreman who had specific knowledge of
the safety standard and was subjected to internal disciplinary sanc-
tions.' 35 The Commission stated in reversing, "the Act does not im-
pose absolute liability upon employers when an employee fails to
follow established safety practices.""'3 The Fourth Circuit in Pike
read Engineers as applying a new standard of liability for employers
and therefore remanded the case.'37
None of the opinions in Ocean cited either Pike or Engineers. This
is curious since in Ocean the circuit adopted a theory of liability
very similar to that put forward by the Commission in Pike and
abandoned in Engineers.
The factual situations in Ocean and Pike are somewhat different.
The foreman's actions in Pike led to his own death. In Ocean, the
foreman's acts and orders in contravention of the safety standard
resulted in the death of a rank and file employee. Indeed, Ocean
limited its holding to the facts of that case:
What this case is not about must first be noted. It is not a case in which a
rank-and-file employee engaged in a suicidal or willfully reckless act that led
to his own injury. Rather it is one in which a foreman, whom the Company
had made responsible for insuring the safe performance of a job, negligently
created an unsafe condition and then ordered a subordinate employee into
129. 557 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1977).
130. Id. at 1046.
131. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.955(a)(6)(ii) (1977).
132. 3 EMPL. SAF. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 20,012 (Sept. 29, 1975).
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b) (1977).
134. The foreman was not injured.
135. 3 EMPL. SAF. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 20,112 at 23,807.
136. Id.
137. 557 F.2d at 1045. The dissenting commissioner in Engineers also read that decision
as being inconsistent with the law as stated by the Commission in Pike. 3 EMPL. SAF. &
HEALTH Guide (CCH) 20,112, at 23,808.
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the area of danger, as a result of which the employee was killed. We think
that for the Act to be meaningful and effective the actions of the foreman
must be imputed to the company in this situation.' 
This distinction can also be applied to the majority of decisions
dealing with employer liability for employee conduct.139 The deci-
sions of REA Express, Getty, and New Bedford Gas, however, can-
not be factually distinguished since they all involve situations where
employee death was traceable to supervisory failure. As noted ear-
lier, REA Express might be applying an imputation theory of liabil-
ity, but the court does not make a clear distinction between foremen
and employees. 140 The same is true of the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Getty.' In New Bedford Gas, the First Circuit discussed the re-
sponsibility of supervisory personnel and employers to guard against
hazardous employee conduct, but decided on the ground that the
applicable regulation afforded inadequate notice under the circum-
stances.' Despite imputation concepts at work in these and other
decisions, the Fourth Circuit, in Ocean became the first, circuit to
apply the standard of respondeat superior to hold an employer liable
under the Act for the conduct of its foremen. More important,
Ocean is also the first case to hold an employer to a higher standard
of liability for its supervisory personnel than for its other employees.
IV. Conclusion
In addition to its factual restriction, Ocean is limited further by
the disagreement among its opinions on the extent of employer lia-
bility for supervisory action. In fact, both concurrence and dissent
rejected the prevailing opinion's adoption of a rule of responsibility
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior as creating a standard
of absolute liability.4 Considering this disparity between the opin-
ions, Ocean seems somewhat of an aberation. Further, there is no
precedent involving serious violations that supports Ocean's adop-
tion of the imputation rationale used in willful violation cases to
138. Ocean, slip op. at 5-6.
139. National Realty, Home, Butler Lime and Cement, and Hanovia all concerned em-
ployees killed due to their own neglience or suicidal recklessness. The employees in National
Realty and Home, however, were foremen.
140. See text accompanying notes 63-69 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 87-96 supra.
143. See Ocean, slip op. at 13-14 (Haynesworth, C.J., concurring); id. at 17-22 (Field, J.,
dissenting).
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find employer willfulness.
Regardless of the ultimate weight afforded the prevailing opinion
in Ocean, factually the case presents a question towards which the
congressional intent is unclear. That is, are supervisory personnel
to be treated as employees or as extensions of the employer? The
majority opinion in Ocean finds that foremen acting in their super-
visory capacity should be equated with their employer. Despite the
disagreement of the concurrence and dissent and indications that
other circuits would decide the question differently, Ocean's ap-
proach has merit. Contrary to the conclusions of the concurring and
dissenting opinions, the application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior in Ocean does not create a standard of strict liability. The
majority builds an inherent limitation of liability by requiring that
foreman be working within the scope of their employment before
liability is occasioned."' Indeed, National Realty took notice that
an employer might rightfully be held more accountable for the
actions of its supervisors.'45 The foreman's function of ensuring the
observance of safety standards is perhaps the most convincing
reason for this heightened accountability. While foremen and em-
ployees in similar supervisory roles do not formulate a company's
safety policy, they do implement it. The method of implementation
has a direct effect on the conditions of employment, which are the
ultimate concern of the Act.
An employer should not be allowed to hide behind his supervisor's
unsafe decisions in favor of haste and cost effectiveness. Such super-
visory decisions, even if negligently made, ultimately benefit the
employer to the detriment of the worker. The Act became law be-
cause the implementation of safety precautions formed a
"competitive disadvantage" for conscientious employers." 8 This
purpose should not be defeated.
Despite the value of the approach taken in Ocean, the Fourth
Circuit's decisions in this area seem somewhat incongruous. In Pike,
the Commission's application of a theory of liability based on
respondeat superior was, in effect, rejected. In Ocean, however, the
circuit indicated that the concept was appropriate in a similar fac-
tual situation. If the role of the courts under the Act is to provide
144. Id. at 11.
145. 489 F.2d at 1267 n. 38.
146. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
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guidance to the administrative bodies on legal questions, then more
definitive word in this area is required. The majority in Ocean
should have specifically distinguished Pike on its facts. As a result
of the seeming inconsistency between the cases, the Commission
cannot be expected to decide similar questions in the same manner
as Ocean.
Finally, the other circuits have either not been presented with the
issue of a differing standard of liability for supervisors, or have not
addressed it clearly. The burden is now upon the other courts of
appeals to accept or reject the approach taken in Ocean, and if
accepted, to further establish its limits.
William D. Yoquinto

